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ABSTRACT 
An Examination of Team Reactions to Negative Performance Feedback and Their 
Relationship to Team Performance. (December 2004) 
Joel Richard Philo, B.A., The University of Texas at Dallas; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Winfred Arthur, Jr. 
 
 
Despite the abundant research regarding individual-level feedback, few studies 
examine team feedback, particularly the relationship between team feedback reactions and 
organizational performance. Through a field study and a lab study, this paper examines two 
reactions to team feedback, specifically blaming and strategizing, and their relationship to 
team performance. Study 1 showed that both blaming and strategizing occur in about 1/3 of 
team feedback meetings in an international sample of teams. Blaming was found to 
negatively correlate with productivity improvement (r = -.59), whereas strategizing was 
found to positively correlate with productivity improvement (r = .33). Study 2 was a lab 
study conducted to addresses several of the limitations from Study 1. The results from Study 
2 were mixed. Although the manipulation failed to differentiate the experimental conditions 
in Study 2, post hoc correlational analyses showed a positive relationship between 
strategizing and viability, and a negative relationship between excuse making and viability. 
Correlational analyses also revealed a negative relationship between blaming or excuse 
making and team cohesion. These results suggest further research is warranted in this area.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Maximizing human capital is becoming increasingly important for organizations (see 
Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003). Such maximization can be accomplished through numerous 
means, one of which is the effective provision of performance feedback. Feedback is the 
action of reporting results on a task to an individual or team. It is thought to lead to increases 
in performance through both a motivational function and a cueing function (e.g., Nadler, 
1979). That is, feedback encourages people to invest effort into tasks, and it helps them direct 
their behavior in an optimal fashion to form more effective task strategies. A large amount of 
literature on feedback is available (e.g., Ammons, 1956; Annett, 1969; Ilgen, Fisher & 
Taylor, 1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Nadler, 1979; Sassenwrath, 1975; Taylor, Fisher & 
Ilgen, 1984). Although Kluger and DeNisi (1996) showed feedback effects are more mixed 
than some have thought, they also noted that many studies have demonstrated the beneficial 
effects of individual feedback on performance in organizations.  
Despite the plethora of research regarding individual-level feedback, there is much less 
research examining team feedback, particularly the reactions of teams to feedback and the 
relationship of these reactions to subsequent performance. This relative paucity of research is 
the impetus for the present study. Specifically, this paper extends the work on feedback to the 
level of teams and examines reactions to feedback as part of the process of translating 
feedback to performance improvement. The present paper focused on two specific reactions 
to team feedback, blaming and strategizing, and the relationship between these reactions and 
subsequent team performance.  
_______________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Applied Psychology. 
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This research was conducted in the form of two studies. Study 1 examined the 
research questions in a field setting, focusing on the productivity component of team 
effectiveness and utilizing a correlational design. Study 2 addressed the inherent limitations 
of Study 1, specifically its inability to lead to causal inferences, by utilizing an experimental 
design to examine a more complete picture of team effectiveness. The theoretical and 
conceptual basis for these studies follows. 
Individual Reactions to Feedback 
Feedback’s relationship to productivity is complex, and researchers such as Kluger 
and DeNisi (1996) have recently called for greater examination of the process of how 
feedback relates to subsequent productivity rather than just the end result of feedback. One 
part of the process between the receipt of feedback and subsequent productivity is the 
reaction of the feedback recipient. The reaction of individuals to the feedback they receive 
has been acknowledged as an important area of research by authors such as Anderson and 
Jones (2000) who stated “responses to feedback regarding organizational behaviors and 
decisions more generally are among the most essential workplace issues” (p. 130). 
 Reactions to feedback have been examined in the literature on performance 
appraisals. Performance appraisals typically consist of feedback on how the individual is 
performing at work, such as annual performance reviews or productivity reports. By 
understanding how reactions to performance appraisals relate to subsequent productivity, 
employers are better able to structure performance appraisals to increase individual 
productivity. Consequently, research on reactions to performance feedback is prevalent, 
ranging from reactions to performance appraisals (Cawley, Keeping & Levey, 1998; Keeping 
& Levy, 2000; Silverman & Wexley, 1984) to reactions to 360-degree feedback (Brett & 
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Atwater, 2001; Facteau, Facteau, Schoel, Russell, & Poteet, 1998). Although this research 
stream provides useful information on how individuals react to feedback, it does not speak to 
how teams or individuals in teams react to feedback. 
The Importance of Teams 
Workers do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in teams or work groups that are 
themselves within larger social structures or organizations (Ilgen, 1999). Researchers are 
increasingly recognizing this fact and focusing on team issues to understand organizational 
performance (e.g., Anderson & West, 1998; Evans & Dion, 1991; Gully, Incalcaterra, Joshi, 
& Beaubien, 2002; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996).  
Some researchers have specifically focused on team-level feedback. For example, 
Mitchell and Silver (1990) found that group goals are more effective for improving 
performance than individual goals on a group task, and Matsui, Kakuyama, and Onglatco 
(1987) emphasized the importance of team members receiving team-level feedback. 
Nevertheless, in an overview of team research, Kozlowski and Bell (2003) noted the paucity 
of research on team motivation and feedback, stressing the importance of congruence 
between team-level and individual-level motivational factors. Most researchers, however, 
tend to focus on individual-level motivation factors. This paper seeks to shift this focus. 
However, in shifting from an individual to a team focus, it is important to clarify what 
constitutes a team. 
Teams Defined 
There are a variety of definitions of teams. According to Guzzo and Dickson (1996) 
the term work groups (which they use interchangeably with the term teams) refers to 
“individuals who see themselves and who are seen by others as a social entity, who are 
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interdependent because of the tasks they perform as members of a group, who are embedded 
in one or more larger social systems (e.g., community, organization), and who perform tasks 
that affect others” (p. 308- 309). In a more recent review, Kozlowski and Bell (2003) also 
note that the terms work groups and teams can be used interchangeably. Their definition of 
teams is more comprehensive than that of Guzzo and Dickson. They state that teams are:  
“two or more individuals who (a) exist to perform organizationally relevant tasks, (b) 
share one or more common goals, (c) interact socially, (d) exhibit task 
interdependencies (i.e., work flow, goals, outcomes), (e) maintain and manage 
boundaries, and (f) are embedded in an organizational context that sets boundaries, 
constrains the team, and influence exchanges with other units in the broader entity” 
(p. 334). 
   
Although this latter definition is more detailed, the two definitions are highly compatible. 
The authors agree that teams consist of two or more people engaging in interdependent tasks 
that impact the larger social structure in which they are embedded, and this is the simple 
definition that will be utilized throughout this paper.  
This definition assumes interdependence, but not all teams are equally 
interdependent. Tesluk, Mathieu, Zaccaro, and Marks (1997) provide a conceptual model for 
understanding the possible differences in interdependence across teams. This model, as 
represented by Arthur, Edwards, Bell and Villado and Bennett’s (in press) team task analysis 
measure, is shown in Figure 1. For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the extent to 
which the reactions of teams to feedback affect subsequent productivity is affected by the 
interdependence of the team. This is because many of the variables that team feedback 
reactions might impact, such as cooperation and team mental models, would be less 
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important to a team that is low on interdependence. Teams that fall into Tesluk et al.’s 
category of pooled/additive interdependence are not interdependent to a sufficient degree to 
meet the definition of teams utilized in this paper because their work does not require any 
significant interaction. The degree to which sequential, reciprocal, and intensive 
interdependence are differentially affected by team reactions is not as clear, because these 
forms of interdependence all require interactions between team members. Team 
interdependence is, therefore, an important moderator to consider when examining 
individuals who have been classified as a team, as the way in which they work may lead to 
different team dynamics and require different amounts of cohesion and cooperation for 
optimal productivity. This logic is supported by Gully et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis, which 
found that interdependence moderates the relationship between team efficacy and 
performance. Beyond understanding what constitutes a team, however, it is also important to 
understand how team effectiveness is defined. 
Team Effectiveness 
Measuring the effectiveness of teams raises several issues. Kozlowski and Bell (2003) 
provide a useful summary of these issues in their review of the literature on team 
effectiveness. Team effectiveness tends to revolve around the Input-Process-Outcomes (IPO) 
model proposed by McGrath (1964). Shea and Guzzo (1987) describe team effectiveness as 
the quantity and quality of a team’s outcomes. Although this definition was roughly 
equivalent to a team’s productivity in Shea and Guzzo’s original conceptualization, it has 
since been expanded to include the ability of a team to function in the future, or team 
viability (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). Effectiveness of a team therefore differs from the 
effectiveness of an individual. Whereas an individual’s effectiveness is often considered as 
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the extent to which an individual meets performance requirements (Pritchard, 1992), for a 
team, effectiveness includes both the work outputs of the team and the social consequences 
of working together. In other words, teams produce both value added outside the team in the 
form of productivity to the organization and value added within a team which is reflected by 
their viability, or willingness to work together again in the future. This social aspect of 
effectiveness differentiates team effectiveness from individual effectiveness. 
 
Team Workflow 
Pattern 
 
Description 
 
Illustration 
1. Pooled/Additive 
Interdependence. 
Work and activities are 
performed separately by all 
team members and work 
does not flow between 
members of the team. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
2. Sequential 
Interdependence. 
Work and activities flow 
from one member to another 
in the team, but mostly in 
one direction. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
3. Reciprocal 
Interdependence. 
Work and activities flow 
between team members in a 
back–and–forth manner 
over a period of time. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
4. Intensive 
Interdependence. 
Work and activities come 
into the team and members 
must diagnose, problem 
solve, and/or collaborate as 
a team in order to 
accomplish the team’s task. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
 
Figure 1. Levels of task interdependence 
 
It is important to understand the process that leads to both components of team 
effectiveness. Industrial/organizational (I/O) psychologists have moved the focus of the IPO 
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model from processes to inputs and outcomes in the team literature (Ilgen, 1999). Although 
Ilgen states that there are many benefits to this shift towards a greater focus on predictors and 
criteria, understanding the intervening variables and processes is also important to diagnosing 
the reasons behind the variety of feedback effects that Kluger and DeNisi (1996) illuminated. 
These authors showed an awareness of the importance of shifting back to the middle of the 
IPO framework when they called for more research on the processes involved in feedback 
interventions, rather than a continued focus on the outcome of feedback interventions.  
Team effectiveness is theoretically impacted by a number of factors. These factors 
include team mental models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994), team climate (Anderson & 
West, 1998), team coherence (Kozlowski, Gully, McHugh, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996), 
transactive memory (Wegner, 1986), cooperation (Wagner, 1995), and communication skills 
(Glickman et al., 1987). However, many of these factors exist prior to the receiving of 
feedback and are not likely to represent the process of responding to feedback. The actual 
process of responding to feedback is a communication process, one component of which is 
the reaction of the feedback recipient to the communicated feedback. Although there is 
literature on reactions to performance feedback such as how individuals respond to 
performance appraisals or 360 feedback (Brett & Atwater, 2001; Cawley, Keeping & Levey, 
1998; Facteau, Facteau, Schoel, Russell, & Poteet, 1998; Keeping & Levey, 2000; Silverman 
& Wexley, 1984;), there is little research on team-level reactions to feedback. Team reactions 
cannot be considered the same as individual reactions because the different level of analysis 
must be taken into consideration (Rousseau, 1985). There are interpersonal dynamics at work 
in a team reaction that cannot occur with an individual reaction. These interpersonal 
dynamics must be considered when evaluating how the feedback will impact effectiveness, 
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which is also different at the team level due to the existence of a broader definition of 
effectiveness at the team level (i.e., viability and productivity, rather than just productivity). 
Team Feedback 
Individual performance appraisals represent a common form of feedback. The 
purpose of performance appraisals is often productivity improvement (Pritchard & DeNisi, 
2003). However, organizations are often composed of teams, and if productivity is measured 
at the team level, then performance appraisals might be most effectively conducted at the 
team level. Although the literature does not often discuss team performance appraisals, some 
organizations and researchers do recognize and utilize this form of feedback, one example of 
which is the Productivity Measurement and Enhancement System or ProMES (Pritchard, 
Jones, Roth, Stuebing, & Ekeberg, 1988, 1989; Pritchard, 1990, 1995). This feedback system 
generally utilizes team-level feedback and shares this feedback through monthly performance 
feedback meetings. On average this system realizes productivity gains of 1.4 standard 
deviations from baseline work performance measures (Pritchard, Paquin, DeCuir, 
McCormick, & Bly, 2002), suggesting the value of providing team-level feedback. Other 
researchers also stress the importance of examining feedback systems at the team level. Hey, 
Pietruschka, Bungard, and Jones (2000) noted that most human resource systems are 
designed at the level of individuals, and they argued that “group oriented intervention 
methods and instruments have to be designed and analyzed” (p. 126). If team feedback and 
how teams respond to such feedback is important, then the issue of how to classify and 
examine such reactions becomes relevant. 
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Team Reactions to Feedback 
A common form of giving feedback to an entire team is to present team-level 
performance data at a team meeting. During such a meeting the collective reactions of the 
team are likely to relate to the extent to which the feedback given to the team impacts future 
team effectiveness. Teams can react in many ways such as by discounting the feedback 
(Ilgen et al., 1979) or changing standards (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Although these reactions 
are important and of theoretical interest, they are not easily observable by managers or others 
who may need to quickly ascertain how a team is responding to feedback. It would be 
valuable to identify visible reactions of team members to feedback, and how these reactions 
relate to subsequent performance. This identification and classification would enable 
managers to more readily identify whether or not feedback is being received in a way that 
will ultimately benefit future performance.  
Many different reactions can occur during a team feedback meeting both between and 
within team members. Lacking a theoretical framework for classifying team feedback 
reactions, it would be difficult to aggregate across different feedback contexts and come up 
with general rules for designing team-level feedback systems and guiding team feedback 
meetings. Such generalizations are sorely needed. Browne and Payne (2002) found that 
managers reported the primary purpose of performance appraisals is for employee feedback 
and development, yet they also identified a lack of training on how to give performance 
feedback as the most significant barrier to its effectiveness. Understanding the response of a 
team to performance feedback, and how it relates to team effectiveness, may allow for the 
training of managers to enable them to more effectively deliver team performance appraisals 
and conduct feedback meetings in response to those appraisals.  
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Recognizing the importance of analyzing the reactions of teams to feedback leads 
back to the issue of classifying reactions into theoretically meaningful dimensions. Although 
the reactions of teams during feedback meetings can be classified and analyzed in numerous 
ways, two reactions in particular can be readily observed and theoretically related to 
subsequent team effectiveness. These reactions are for the team to engage in blaming 
(internal to the team or external) and for the team to engage in team strategizing. Not only are 
these reactions easily monitored by managers during feedback meetings, they are also 
theoretically separable. Blaming likely creates affectively charged situations, which are 
theoretically important for understanding team performance (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). In 
contrast, strategizing among team members is generally a cognitively laden task which is 
likely to improve their understanding of the team task, and hence their motivation (Naylor, 
Pritchard, & Ilgen, 1980). The theoretical arguments linking the behaviors of blaming and 
strategizing to team performance are expanded below. 
Task Strategizing 
Pritchard and DeNisi (2003) proposed that, “the more employees are given 
information and opportunities to develop more effective work strategies, the more 
performance appraisal will lead to increased performance” (p. 20). Schmidt and Kleinbeck 
(1990) also noted the importance of work strategies in their review of why goals positively 
affect performance. They suggested that goals prompt the search for or the development of 
effective work strategies in order to attain the goals. Many researchers have empirically 
demonstrated the importance of improving task strategies in order to improve performance 
(Earley & Perry, 1987; Locke, Frederick, & Bobko, 1984).  
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Assessment center (AC) researchers have also discussed the importance of learning 
and developing better work strategies. Thornton and Byham (1982) noted that ACs have 
increasingly been used for developmental purposes rather than selection. Specifically, 
Spychalski, Quinones, Gaugler, and Pohley (1997) stated that 40% of ACs have 
developmental planning as their objective, which indicates that organizations are increasingly 
focusing on improving the knowledge of their workers, potentially improving worker task 
strategies.  
The importance of task strategies has also been posited at the team level by 
Hackman’s (1987) Normative Model of team effectiveness, which clearly shows the 
importance of team task strategies. The three components of team effectiveness in his model 
are team effort, team knowledge and skill, and team performance strategies (ways of 
accomplishing a common task). When describing the conditions that promote appropriate 
performance strategies, Hackman noted the importance of performance assessments and a 
willingness in the team to consider alternative ways to do things. This willingness of teams to 
consider alternative ways of doing a task suggests the importance of feedback acceptance as 
a precursor to change.  
Developmental feedback acceptance has also been studied by Bell and Arthur (2003), 
who investigated individual feedback acceptance in ACs. They noted that the “acceptance of 
the information is paramount to change” (p. 3). Assuming that the task strategies developed 
in reaction to AC developmental feedback are useful, then acceptance and utilization of the 
new strategies should ultimately improve performance.  
These arguments suggest that acceptance of feedback is an important component of 
its effectiveness. Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor (1979) theorized factors that contribute to 
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feedback acceptance. The sign of the feedback is theorized to be of importance. Specifically, 
they posited that positive feedback is likely to be seen as more accurate than negative 
feedback, perhaps because of a self-serving bias. If negative feedback is more likely to be 
rejected than positive feedback, as several researchers have found (Bell & Arthur, 2003; 
Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, & Houston, 1976; Kudisch, 1997), then task strategy 
development that is perceived as a negative episode of feedback might run the risk of being 
rejected.  
This issue is complicated however by the issue of team-level feedback. Teams are 
collections of individuals and may not all accept feedback to the same degree. Automatic 
rejection of negative feedback, however, would prevent work teams from benefiting from the 
developmental opportunities inherent in many forms of negative feedback. Team strategizing 
is one way that teams can bring members together to focus on improvements. By collectively 
discussing ways to respond to negative feedback and achieve improvements, a team may 
assume some base level of feedback acceptance. 
Other reasons for why negative feedback might be accepted, thereby laying the 
groundwork for strategizing, can be extrapolated from Swann’s (1987) self-verification 
theory, which could be extended to the level of teams. Swann’s theory states that individuals 
will accept feedback regardless of sign, as long as it matches their self-perception. If this 
theory could reasonably be extrapolated to the team level it would suggest that teams would 
accept feedback that matches their perception of the performance capabilities of the team. 
Teams that perceive that they have room for growth might therefore be more willing to 
accept negative feedback that indicates growth potential. Such extrapolation is likely only 
justified in situations where the teams have a unified concept of the team.  
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This logic may partially explain why there is a curvilinear relationship between the 
amount of time a team is together and the performance of the team (Guzzo & Dickson, 
1996). Teams with high familiarity may have high team efficacy, which is the collective 
belief in the extent to which a team can be effective in accomplishing a task (Edmonson, 
1999). High team efficacy may lower the likelihood that corrective, negative feedback will 
be accepted, as it might conflict with the potent team concept. Not accepting negative 
feedback that could potentially improve the productivity of the team might therefore prevent 
the team from correcting problems in their performance, leading to lowered productivity over 
time.  
However, all this logic depends on the premise that individuals can interpret feedback 
at the level of a team rather than just as individuals. Such shifts in levels of attention are 
theoretically possible according to Lord, Brown, and Freiberg (1999). In their theory of 
leadership, they state that not only is it possible for individuals to perceive feedback and 
actions from multiple levels of an organizational hierarchy, but that such perception shifts are 
critical to the role of leaders. They theorize that effective leadership is enhanced by the 
manipulation of followers’ working self-concepts. Lord et al. suggested that working self-
concepts (which is the view of the self that is active) could be oriented at the self-level, 
interpersonal level, or group (team) level. Although Swann (1987) focused on the individual, 
if individuals do have a variety of working self-concepts, then it is likely that the working 
self-concept that is active at the time of feedback (and theoretically only one can be active) 
will determine what the feedback would be compared against. This view would suggest that 
individuals with a team-level working self-concept would react differently to negative 
feedback than individuals with a self-level working self-concept. Such shifts could 
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theoretically be instigated by tasks that encourage team cooperation, such as strategizing, or 
by affective events such as those that can occur from blaming. The theory that team members 
may react differently to negative feedback depending on their working self-concept leads to 
several questions.  
One question is what happens to a team’s working self-concept following feedback? 
Is it possible that different types of feedback can lead to different working self-concepts 
being activated? Another question is whether team-generated feedback is similar to self-
generated feedback when an individual is operating under a team-level self-concept. Kluger 
and DeNisi (1996) suggested that self-feedback is most readily accepted and credible. Ilgen, 
Fisher, and Taylor (1979) similarly stressed the credibility of self-feedback. If self-feedback 
were similar to feedback generated within a team for individuals working under a team-level 
self-concept, then this would suggest that strategies developed within a team are especially 
credible and accepted. This suggests that feedback on how to specifically improve task 
strategies that is imposed from a source external to a team may be less effective in creating 
behavior change than strategies developed within a team. Because the goal of negative 
performance feedback is generally to change the behavior of the team in order to improve 
performance, it is of interest to know both the extent to which teams will strategize in 
response to negative feedback and how to encourage a team working self-concept versus an 
individual self-concept during a feedback session. 
Therefore, one of the first research questions addressed in the present study focuses 
on the extent to which teams engage in strategizing following the receipt of negative team-
level feedback. To the extent that they do engage in strategizing, the preceding arguments 
would suggest that this could enhance their future performance due to the level of acceptance 
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implied by spontaneous strategizing and due to the improved strategies that may result. It is 
also possible that strategizing indicates a working self-concept at the team level, which could 
enhance cooperation. This leads to the first hypothesis. 
H1: There will be a significant positive relationship between the percentage of time in 
a feedback meeting that a team spends strategizing and the degree to which a team’s 
productivity improves following the meeting. 
Although strategizing may not always be beneficial, the first hypothesis suggests that 
more often than not it will be a positive sign for future performance. However, it is possible 
that team members could differ with one another and that conflict could result in a team 
feedback meeting. This is a very different reaction from strategizing and could theoretically 
have the opposite effect. Actions that create friction between team members may be 
affectively charged and may reduce the sense of cohesion and unity within a team, which 
could theoretically prompt a shift from a team-level working self-concept to an individual 
working self-concept. One manifestation of this negativity could be blaming between team 
members. 
Blaming 
Team members do not automatically increase their productivity following 
performance feedback. Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) demonstrated this fact when they found 
in their meta-analysis that approximately one third of feedback interventions actually had a 
negative effect on performance. Although this analysis focused on individual feedback, the 
basic rationale that not all feedback is beneficial to performance likely extends to team 
feedback as well. One of the reasons for unfavorable reactions to feedback may be a lack of 
acceptance. Such a lack of acceptance can be caused by numerous factors. In the case of 
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negative feedback, lack of acceptance may be promoted by the fundamental attribution error 
(Ross, Green, & House, 1977). The fundamental attribution error is the tendency for 
individuals to personally take credit for positive outcomes and blame external factors for 
negative outcomes. In addition, individuals have a tendency to attribute the positive results of 
others to external factors, and blame negative results on the internal factors of others. There 
are many factors that can influence the likelihood of making such attribution errors, such as 
being in an outgroup or potentially the level of attention at which an individual is operating. 
It is possible that the fundamental attribution error is less likely to occur in a team if the team 
members are paying more attention to team-level motivational factors than individual level 
motivational factors (Ellemers, de Gilder, & Haslam, 2004). In sum, it is not uncommon for 
individuals who personally receive negative feedback to seek to place blame on factors 
external to themselves, either blaming other team members or factors external to the team, 
though this error may be less likely if the team members are motivated by and paying 
attention to team-level phenomenon. 
Internal Blaming 
There are many potential problems that result from blaming factors internal to the 
team or finger pointing. The fundamental attribution error would suggest that team members 
would not only avoid accepting personal responsibility for negative feedback, but might also 
attribute that feedback to factors external to themselves, potentially even to the activities of 
fellow team members. Such attributions might negatively affect team performance through 
more than just the individual rejection of feedback. Blaming internal to the team has the 
potential to erode the confidence of team members in their own abilities or those of their 
teammates. It might also interrupt the development of positive team dynamics, such as team 
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cohesion. The potential threat of being blamed might also lead to decrements in individual 
performance that negatively affect the team’s performance. 
Interference with Team Dynamics  
Several researchers have proposed that when cohesion within a team is high, the team 
will be more motivated and will be able to better work together to be productive (Cartwright, 
1968; Davis, 1969). Beal, Cohen, Burke, and McLendon’s (2003) meta-analysis confirmed 
that there is a positive relationship between the cohesiveness of teams and their performance 
on tasks. However, these authors also confirmed the importance of understanding the multi-
dimensional nature of cohesion. The three components of team cohesion are generally 
considered to be interpersonal attraction, task commitment, and group pride. Within-team 
blaming might interfere with the development and maintenance of team cohesion. 
Specifically, the negative affectivity that can be associated with being personally and 
publicly blamed for poor performance has the potential to decrease the interpersonal 
attraction within a team. For the person being blamed, there might also be a tendency to 
experience lowered group pride as part of the process of disengaging from the source of 
negative feedback (in this case, the blaming team members).  
To the extent that a task requires cooperation, friction within a team might also lead 
to a decrease in the extent to which a team perceives that they are able to perform a team 
task, or a decreased sense of team efficacy, unless team members believe that they can 
cooperate despite the friction. Teams in which individuals blame each other for negative 
feedback may therefore have less belief in their ability to accomplish a task as a team, 
particularly for highly interdependent tasks. Such lowered beliefs in the ability of a team to 
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effectively perform tasks have been found to be associated with lower levels of team 
performance (Gully et al., 2002). 
Individual Ego Threats  
Lowered team efficacy might also be accompanied at the individual level by lowered 
perceptions of the efficacy of other individual team members. There might also be lowered 
self-efficacy among individual team members, particularly for those individual team 
members who are receiving the blame from fellow team members. Ilgen and Davis (2000) 
theorized that feelings of incompetence and lowered self-efficacy, such as a bout of finger 
pointing might produce, are a serious problem. Specifically, they stated “the most critical 
issue for delivering negative feedback is the balance between making it possible for 
performers to accept responsibility for substandard performance and, at the same time, not 
lower their self-concept” (p. 561). The individual nature of finger pointing and blaming may 
lead to a higher risk of lowered individual perceptions of ability, which, according to the 
Naylor et al. (1980) model of behavior, would have a negative effect on motivation to 
perform. This might also lead to the seeking of feedback more consistent with one’s self-
concept.  
If team members are prone to blame each other during team feedback sessions, then 
this might make team feedback more threatening. Creating a more threatening atmosphere in 
feedback meetings is contrary to Hey et al.’s (2002) recommendation that team feedback be 
nonthreatening in order to increase its effectiveness. This suggests that when the reactions of 
a team during a feedback meeting include blaming and finger pointing, the effect of the 
feedback on performance may be diluted or even be negative due to the ego threats inherent 
in such a situation. 
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Utilizing Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) Feedback Intervention Theory framework, one 
could further theorize that blaming in a team feedback meeting could contribute to the 
development of detrimental meta-task cognitions among team members. Meta-task 
cognitions are thoughts about the self as they relate to the task, which are often distracting 
and tend to compete with task-related thoughts during task performance. If team members 
feel personally blamed for negative performance, this might contribute to detriments in 
performance due to the attention distraction of meta-task cognitions among individual team 
members. This is in line with the research of Hinsz, Tindale, and Vollrath (1997) who 
theorized that deindividuation increases individual team members’ attention to task 
information. Thus, individualized blaming likely decreases attention to task information and 
thereby inhibits improvement on tasks and the development of useful team-level phenomena 
such as transactive memory (Wegner, 1986). There are also motivational differences between 
team members who deindividuate and shift their focus to the level of the team. Such a person 
may place greater value on team-level rewards and team dynamics than an individual more 
focused on the self (Ellemers et al., 2004). Internal blaming could therefore discourage 
deindividuation. Such blaming might also induce friction within the team at the detriment of 
team cohesion and cause team members to not want to work together again in the future, 
lowering the viability of the team. 
These arguments suggest that internal blaming is a reaction to feedback that should be 
studied in order to understand the relationships between team feedback and subsequent 
productivity. The second research objective is therefore to examine the extent to which 
individual employees within teams blame each other in response to negative team-level 
feedback.  
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External Blaming (Excuse Making) 
Blaming can also occur without team members actually blaming each other. Team 
members can choose to blame negative feedback on factors external to the team. Although 
this would prevent many of the potential pitfalls of blaming fellow team members, it still 
may represent a lack of acceptance, which can preempt many of the benefits of feedback. If 
the feedback system, feedback agent, or other outside processes are perceived as the cause of 
negative results, then the team members will be limited in the extent to which they perceive 
that they can change their results and may perceive themselves as having low team efficacy 
or else reject the feedback outright. Lack of acceptance might be exemplified in a team 
feedback meeting by the prevalence of excuse making. Blaming that is external to the team 
may represent an instance of attempting to avoid acceptance of a negative feedback message 
without engaging in detrimental within-team blaming. This lack of acceptance is problematic 
because, as Ilgen et al. (1979) note, in the absence of a source of power forcing behavior 
change, acceptance of feedback is a necessary prerequisite to behavior change. If an 
individual or a team fails to accept the feedback that they receive, and is not forced to change 
their behavior, then they are unlikely to change their behavior in response to the feedback. As 
acceptance of the feedback is a precursor to behavior change (Ilgen et al., 1979), it is not 
likely that external excuse making will result in improved performance following feedback.  
These arguments suggest that blaming is an important reaction to study because it can 
moderate the motivational effect of feedback. Through external blaming teams could dismiss 
feedback reducing the potential for goal-setting and motivation towards improvement. 
Through internal blaming, teams could focus more on self-motives than on team motives 
which could discourage attempts to promote cohesion and perceptions of team viability. 
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Conversely, strategizing as a team-level activity might encourage deindividuation and 
promote cohesion, especially if it shows team cooperation to be an important strategy for 
success. This cohesive activity could be affectively rewarding and improve the team’s sense 
of efficacy which might increase the perceived viability of the team among the team 
members. This suggests a hierarchy of team responses to negative performance feedback, 
with strategizing being positively related to future team effectiveness, internal blaming being 
negatively related, and external blaming falling somewhere in between. These arguments 
lead to the following four hypotheses. 
H2: There will be a significant negative relationship between the percentage of time 
in a feedback meeting that a team spends engaging in blaming (both external or 
internal) and the amount of team productivity improvement following the meeting. 
H3: The post-feedback productivity of teams that engage in strategizing will be 
significantly greater than that of teams engaging in external or internal blaming. 
H4: The post-feedback productivity of teams that engage in external blaming will be 
significantly higher than teams engaging in internal blaming. 
H5: Teams that engage in internal blaming will subsequently report significantly 
lower team cohesion and team viability than teams that engage in external blaming 
or strategizing. 
Examining the Research Questions 
The research objectives and hypotheses were examined with a two-study approach. 
The first study examined a field sample of teams that received productivity feedback at 
regular intervals. This study addressed the research question of whether naturally occurring 
teams engage in the behaviors of strategizing and blaming (external and internal) in response 
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to performance feedback (both positive and negative). This study also allowed for a broad 
examination of the relationship between these reactions and subsequent productivity 
improvement. Study 2 utilized a controlled, lab design to address Hypotheses 3 through 5 and 
to examine causality for the effects observed. The second study attempted to remedy many of 
the limitations of the first study.  
One such limitation is that the size of teams may influence many of the variables of 
interest and team size varies in Study 1. Team size can limit the extent to which team 
members can effectively contribute to team strategizing and might also increase the 
likelihood of in-groups and out-groups forming, which could impact overall team cohesion 
and viability. Extremely large teams may have different limitations and dynamics than teams 
that are small enough for all team members to have the opportunity to contribute to team 
discussions and establish bonds with other team members. Because the size of a team may 
influence many of the variables of interest, Study 2 controlled for the size of the team by 
keeping it constant. This second study also separately examined external versus internal 
blaming, in order to determine if these two forms of shifting blame have different effects on 
subsequent productivity.  
Another limitation of Study 1 is the lack of measures of team cohesion and team 
viability, as viability is a component of team effectiveness and cohesion is a predictor of 
team viability. Study 2 specifically included measures of these variables to test the extent to 
which the three reactions previously discussed impact these related components of team 
effectiveness. The broad field perspective of Study 1 and the controlled lab setting of Study 2 
were meant to complement one another and provide a clearer picture of the relationship 
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between the team feedback reactions of strategizing and blaming and how they relate to 
subsequent performance. 
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STUDY 1 
Before any of the hypotheses can be examined, the research question of whether or 
not teams engage in strategizing and blaming in the field must be addressed. If these 
reactions are rare or infrequent, this series of hypotheses may be irrelevant or of limited 
usefulness to managers. The focus of Study 1 is to address the fundamental question of 
whether real work teams actually engage in strategizing or blaming in response to 
performance feedback and whether these reactions relate to the team’s subsequent 
productivity. These research questions were addressed using a longitudinal database of field 
productivity interventions that result in regular team-level feedback.  
Method 
Participants 
 
The database of field productivity interventions is a result of numerous applications 
of the Productivity Measurement and Enhancement System or ProMES (Pritchard et al., 
1988, 1989; Pritchard, 1990, 1995). ProMES interventions involve a series of team meetings 
to establish measurements for all of a team’s core work duties, prioritize these work duties, 
and then create a system for providing teams with regular team-level feedback on the extent 
to which they are contributing to the organization’s productivity through their performance 
on these work duties. Data from these interventions has been collected in a database over 
several years, resulting in information on longitudinal ProMES interventions for 66 teams 
from a wide variety of industries, types of jobs, and countries (the diversity of the sample and 
the relatively small sample size makes it difficult to control for industry, job, or country). 
With a sample of this size, the power to detect a medium effect size is .79 (p = .05). The size 
of teams ranges from 3 to 50 with a mean of 21 (SD = 18). In each of these interventions, 
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teams met regularly to discuss their performance from the previous measurement period. 
Measurement periods ranged from 1 to 14 weeks with a mean of 4 weeks (SD = 2.5).  
Procedure 
The ProMES database was used for this study. This database consisted of data from 
66 ProMES interventions performed on teams from many different nations. There were two 
main components to this database. The first component consisted of the answers from a 
questionnaire completed at the end of a ProMES intervention by the person in charge of 
organizing and running the intervention. This questionnaire covered many aspects of the 
ProMES project and was completed by the person who facilitated the implementation of the 
ProMES system shortly after design of the system (follow up measures were collected after a 
6 month period of feedback), but only the section of the questionnaire dealing with feedback 
meetings was utilized for this study. The second component of the database consists of 
longitudinal data collected over the course of the ProMES project on the productivity of the 
team. This productivity data is collected both before and after the initiation of ProMES 
feedback meetings. It can therefore serve as a criterion of the effectiveness of the ProMES 
intervention.   
Measures 
Blaming and Strategizing  
The facilitators who worked with teams to design and implement the feedback 
systems filled out a questionnaire once the ProMES system was designed and implemented. 
In this questionnaire the facilitator thoroughly described many aspects of the final ProMES 
system, including the average length of feedback meetings and the percentage of time during 
the feedback meeting that was spent on each of six different possible feedback reactions. 
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These activities were: constructive performance feedback, problem identification, developing 
improvement strategies, discussing future goals, blaming and searching for excuses, 
irrelevant discussion, other positive discussion, and other negative discussion. The 
percentage of time spent on each of these activities had to sum to 100%. Explanations were 
provided on the rating sheet for each of these activities and the raters who recorded the 
information were familiar with both the teams and with providing ratings, though no formal 
training was conducted to ensure consistency in ratings.   
For the purposes of this study, the question regarding the percentage of time spent on 
developing improvement strategies was used as an index of strategizing. The question on the 
percentage of time spent blaming and searching for excuses was used as an index of blaming. 
This section of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix A. For the purposes of Study 1, it was 
not possible to examine internal and external blaming separately, as this distinction was not 
made at the time of data collection.  
Productivity Improvement 
 Productivity improvement following feedback was operationalized as the effect size 
for the ProMES intervention. This effect size was calculated by comparing average total team 
productivity for the baseline period (before teams received and discussed performance 
feedback) to average total team productivity during the feedback period (after teams began 
regularly receiving and discussing performance feedback). The calculation of effect sizes was 
done by taking the difference between the team’s mean performance during baseline and 
their mean performance during feedback and dividing by the pooled standard deviation of 
these performance scores across time periods. A sample of a feedback report given to team 
members that shows overall effectiveness scores is shown in Appendix B.  
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Results 
One condition needed to explore the relationship between strategizing, blaming, and 
performance is that there actually be blaming and strategizing in the teams studied, and that 
there is some variability in these feedback reactions across groups. The mean percentage of 
time spent blaming was 10.5%, (SD = 11), with a minimum of 0% (13 cases) and a 
maximum of 37.5%. The mean percentage of time spent on strategizing was 20%, (SD = 14), 
with a minimum of 0% (2 cases) and a maximum of 45%. These data show that, on average, 
30.5% of the time spent in feedback meetings was spent on either developing strategies for 
improvement or placing blame. Also, there were many more teams that refrained from 
blaming than there were teams that refrained from strategizing during feedback meetings.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted there would be a positive relationship between the percentage of 
time a team spent strategizing and the team’s performance improvement. Conversely, 
Hypothesis 2 predicted there would be a negative relationship between the percentage of time 
a team spent engaging in blaming and the team’s performance improvement. In a one-tailed 
test of significance, Hypothesis 1 was supported, r (32) = .32, p = .04, as was Hypothesis 2, r 
(32) = -.59, p = .00.  The number of cases for these analyses was reduced due to missing 
data. Utilizing pairwise deletion, the pattern of missing productivity information and ratings 
resulted in the sample being reduced by about 50%. This reduced the power of the analysis, 
but the findings were significant nonetheless. 
In the interest of understanding the influence of time on this phenomenon several post-
hoc analyses were conducted. Variation in the sample size for these analyses is due to the 
pattern of missing data. A regression was conducted controlling for the number of feedback 
meetings at step one and the average length of feedback meetings at step two (see Table 1). 
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The relationship at step one of the equation between the number of feedback meetings and 
performance improvement was not significant R (31) = .34, p = .06. At step two of the 
regression, the relationship between the number of feedback meetings and the average length 
of feedback meetings was significant R (31) = .66, p = .00. At step three of the regression, the 
percentage of time spent blaming and strategizing and performance improvement was not 
incrementally significant, R (31) = .73, p = .00, although the beta weight for blaming was 
significantly negative.  
 
Table 1 
Regression Predicting Team Performance Improvement Controlling for Total Feedback Time 
Step β R2 ∆ R2 
1. # FB mtgs  .34 .11  
2. # FB mtgs  .13 .43*** .32*** 
   Avg. mtg time  .60**   
3. # FB mtgs  .13 .54*** .10 
   Avg. mtg time  .45**   
    Strategizing -.18   
    Blaming -.44*   
Note. N = 31. Feedback (FB) time is the total time spent receiving feedback, strategizing is 
the percent of time spent strategizing per meeting, blaming is the percent of time spent 
blaming per meeting 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
 
In order to further understand whether blaming interacts with time, the dataset was 
coded into two groups on the basis of whether or not there was any blaming present in the 
feedback meeting. Group A spent no time blaming, whereas Group B spent at least some 
amount of their feedback meeting on blaming. The mean performance improvement for 
Group A was 1.76, whereas for Group B it was .81. A t-test on the performance improvement 
between these groups was not significant t (30) = 2.18.  
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Due to the wide range of team sizes and the potential differences in the interpersonal 
dynamics of large teams versus small teams, team size was also examined. Similar to the 
procedure followed for the regression controlling for time spent on feedback, team size was 
entered into the first step of a regression equation followed by the strategizing and blaming 
variables in step two. Table 2 shows that after controlling for team size, only blaming 
significantly predicted performance improvement. The correlations between team size, 
performance improvement, blaming and strategizing were examined in Table 3.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Predicting Team Performance Improvement Controlling for Team Size 
Step β R2 ∆ R2 
1. Team Size -.35 .12  
2. Team Size -.07 .35** .23* 
    Strategizing .10   
    Blaming -.48*   
Note. N = 30. Team Size is the number of people in the team, strategizing is the percent of 
time spent strategizing per meeting, blaming is the percent of time spent blaming per meeting 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
 
Table 3 
Correlations Among Team Size, Effect Size, Blaming and Strategizing 
 
 Improvement Blaming Strategizing 
Team Size -0.21 .46** -.43** 
Improvement  -.59** .32* 
Blaming   -.56** 
Note. Team Size is the number of people in the team, strategizing is the percent of time spent 
strategizing per meeting, blaming is the percent of time spent blaming per meeting, 
improvement is a measure of the performance improvement of the team following feedback.  
*p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Study 1 Discussion 
The frequency analysis suggests that blaming and strategizing occurred with some 
regularity in the feedback meetings and there was variability across teams for both measures, 
suggesting that this is a phenomenon that naturally occurs during feedback meetings. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported with a significant medium effect between percentage of time 
spent strategizing and productivity improvement. Hypothesis 2 was also supported, 
indicating a negative relationship between blaming and performance improvement. However 
several follow-up analyses suggested that the findings are more complicated due to potential 
confounds. 
In order to examine the question of whether time is acting as a confound in this 
analysis, two additional analyses were conducted. The first analysis was a regression, which 
controlled for the total amount of time spent on feedback by entering the number of feedback 
meetings into step one of the equation and average feedback meeting time into step two. 
Blaming and strategizing were then entered together into the regression at step three because 
there was no a priori hypothesis for whether one of the reactions should predict incrementally 
more than the other. At step three of the regression, percent of time spent blaming was found 
to predict performance improvement incrementally more than time spent on feedback. In 
other words, although the total time spent on feedback was a major predictor of productivity 
improvement, the percentage of that time spent blaming predicted incrementally beyond this 
total time. Spending more time blaming therefore appears to be related to less performance 
improvement in a team over time. Strangely, strategizing did not significantly predict 
performance improvement beyond the total amount of time spent on feedback. The reasons 
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for this are not clear, although having a better understanding of the qualitative nature of the 
feedback meetings might shed light on this finding.  
A second analysis was to compare teams that engaged in some blaming to those that did 
not engage in any blaming at all. This was meant to investigate the idea that the mere 
presence of blaming has a deleterious effect on team performance, and that a little blaming is 
as bad as a lot of blaming. Although the mean performance was higher in the non-blaming 
groups than in the blaming groups, the difference between these groups was not significant. 
In conjunction with the previous analysis, this suggests that blaming is not an all or nothing 
phenomenon and that a lot of blaming might be worse than a moderate amount of blaming. 
Team size was also examined, as performance improvements might be influenced by 
the size of the team utilizing the feedback. Regression analysis revealed team size to be a 
significant predictor of performance improvement and blaming and strategizing were not 
found to predict beyond this variable. Correlational analyses showed that there is a moderate 
to strong relationship among team size, strategizing, and blaming, suggesting that team size 
is a possible confound in understanding the relationship among blaming, strategizing, and 
performance improvement. 
Finally, it is important to note that the findings for blaming did not differentiate 
between internal and external blaming. Because the ratings for blaming included both excuse 
making and internal blaming, it is possible that the results for Hypothesis 2 were due to 
excuse making rather than internal blaming. The inability to determine how the two sub-
types of blaming contribute to the overall relationship between blaming and productivity 
improvement is a limitation of Study 1.  
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The mixed results in Study 1 (such as a negative beta weight for strategizing in Table 1) 
in conjunction with its limitations (small sample size, no causal inferences possible, 
variability in team size, and combination of blaming sub-types) suggested a need for a 
follow-up study to further analyze the relationship between the content of feedback meetings 
and subsequent team performance. Accordingly, a lab study was designed to more closely 
examine the research questions. 
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STUDY 2 
 The second study was designed to address the limitations of the initial field study. 
Although external validity is enhanced through the use of field data, the nature of the data 
and limitations of the manipulations prevent a full examination of the questions of interest. 
The limitations of the first study include the inability to establish causal relationships, the 
combination of internal and external blaming into one measure, the possible confound of 
team size, and the lack of team cohesion or team viability measures. A lab study can address 
all of these limitations. By utilizing random assignment and experimentally manipulating the 
responses of teams to feedback it is possible to examine causality. Also, by creating 
experimental conditions that encourage either external blaming (excuse making) or internal 
blaming, it becomes possible to examine differences in the effects of these reactions on team 
effectiveness. The issue of team size can be addressed by holding it constant. Measuring 
team viability addresses the final limitation and provides a full measure of team 
effectiveness. By addressing these limitations, Study 2 attempted to examine Hypotheses 3 
through 5. 
Method 
Participants 
 There were 450 individual participants who were recruited from a large southwestern 
university and received course credit for participation in the study. The sample of participants 
was 55% male and 45% female. The sample was 85% Caucasian, 8% African-American, 3% 
Asian, 2% Hispanic, and 1% Other (1% did not report their race). The age of the participants 
ranged from 17 to 28, with a mean of 19.14 (SD = 1.07). The majority of the participants 
were freshman (60%), while 27% were sophomores, 8% were juniors, 4% were seniors, and 
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1% did not report their classification. The participants were scheduled in teams of three, with 
the stipulation that team members should not know each other prior to the experiment. A 
demographic questionnaire was administered to obtain information on the demographics of 
the sample and included a question assessing the extent to which team members knew each 
other prior to the experiment. Teams were not allowed to participate in the study if they 
verbally reported high level of prior knowledge of a team member when told of the study 
requirements. A questionnaire item also examined the extent to which participants had prior 
knowledge of a teammate. No participants reported high prior knowledge of their teammates.  
 Based on a medium effect size predicted in Study 2 due to the results of Study 1, a 
sample of 150 teams was collected in order to ensure a power of .80 (Cohen, 1992). The goal 
was 50 teams per experimental condition. Due to unpredictability in the cancellation pattern 
of experiments, the final sample consisted of 50 teams in the strategizing condition 
(Condition A), 45 teams in the excuse making condition (Condition B) and 55 teams in the 
blaming condition (Condition C).     
Experimental Task 
The task used in this study was designed by Zaccaro, Foti, and Kenny (1991) and is 
entitled The Manufacturing Task. The objective of the task is for the 3 team members to 
produce 3 products (jeeps, robots, and boats) to sell to the researcher for a pre-established 
market price, which changes periodically. The materials required to produce the jeeps, 
robots, and boats are Lego© blocks. The costs of the raw materials (i.e., the Lego© blocks; 
see Appendix C), the instructions for assembly (Appendix D), the order form for raw 
materials (Appendix E), the list of pieces needed (Appendix F), and the diagram for assembly 
(Appendix G) are provided to the team prior to the production phase of the exercise. 
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 In order to ensure interdependence on the task, the task was slightly modified. Each 
member of the team was assigned a limitation that necessitated cooperation. One member of 
the team could not touch the 2x2 Legos. Another member of the team could not touch the 
2x4 Legos. The third team member could not buy or sell Legos or products. Because the task 
required using 2x4s, 2x2s and buying and selling, team members had to rely on each other to 
complete the task. The team decided together before each performance period who would 
have which limitation. Having the ability to decide which team member got which limitation 
allowed team members an additional avenue of strategy. 
Procedure 
 
A 3-way (internal blaming condition, strategizing condition, and excuse making 
condition) between-subjects factorial design was used for this study. Participants attended a 
one-and-a-half hour experimental session divided into two performance phases. All 
participants were advised prior to the experiment that if they had a prior relationship with a 
fellow participant then they would be excluded. Before the experiment participants were 
asked whether they had a pre-existing relationship with any other study participants. If such a 
relationship was identified, one of the people in the relationship was excused and the 
experiment was cancelled if too few people remained.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions described below. In 
all three conditions participants began by signing a consent form. They then completed a 
demographic questionnaire and were given instructions on how to perform their task. The 
team members were informed that they had 20 minutes to perform the task and that the team 
with the highest profit among all participants would receive $20 per member as a reward.  
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The teams performed the task for 20 minutes and, when they finished, they were 
given a second questionnaire, which measured team viability, team cohesion, 
deindividuation, task interdependence, and team efficacy. Upon completion of this 
questionnaire their final profit was calculated. The experimenter then referred to a fictitious 
norms sheet and informed the participants that their profit was at the 33rd percentile on the 
task, well below average. The experimenter informed the team that they would be given a 
second chance to perform the task and obtain a higher profit to increase their chance of 
getting the reward. Before beginning the second performance period, teams were given 
instructions depending on which experimental condition they were in. 
The teams in Condition A were asked to collectively generate a list of strategies for 
improving their performance on this task. This represented the strategizing condition. Teams 
in Condition B were asked as a team to generate a list of excuses and factors outside their 
control to explain their low profit on the task. This represented the external blaming 
condition. Teams in Condition C were asked as a team to generate a list of reasons within 
their control for their low profit on the task. This represented the internal blaming condition. 
Participants in each of these conditions had 10 minutes following feedback from the first 
performance period to engage in discussion before engaging in the task for a second time. If 
participants stopped discussing before the 10 minutes expired, then the amount of time spent 
discussing was recorded and the next stage of the experiment was started. 
Upon completion of the second performance period, teams in all three conditions 
completed the third and final questionnaire, which contained all the scales from the second 
questionnaire, but in a different order and with the addition of several items to check the 
success of the manipulation. Participants were then debriefed. 
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Measures 
Team Viability 
Team viability was measured using a three-item scale designed by Sinclair (2003). 
Sample items include “I would be willing to participate in another study with this same group 
of individuals.” In this study, internal consistency of the scores for this scale was .84 at Time 
1 and .90 at Time 2. This scale is shown in Appendix K. 
Team Cohesion 
 The overall functioning of the team was assessed with the Cohesion- Group 
Environment Questionnaire (Widmeyer, Brawley, & Carron, 1985). This scale was slightly 
modified by removing the group integration sub-scale, because the items in this scale 
referenced longer tenured teams. Sample items in the scale used for this study are “I do not 
like the style of interaction on this team” (reverse scored) and “Our team is united in trying to 
reach its goals for performance.” Internal consistency of the scores for this 9-item scale was 
.68 at Time 1 and .69 at Time 2. This scale is shown in Appendix L. 
Task Interdependence  
Task interdependence was assessed using a single item graphical scale designed 
around Tesluk et al.’s (1997) model of interdependence. This model posits that the amount of 
team interdependence for tasks can differ along four levels. They call these levels: 
pooled/additive interdependence, sequential interdependence, reciprocal interdependence, 
and intensive interdependence. The rating scale used in this study asks participants to make a 
global judgment regarding the nature of the performance task using this model. As in Arthur 
et al. (in press), the four levels of team interdependency are graphically represented as 
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response options to obtain ratings describing the level of interdependency for, in this case, 
the entire task. This scale is shown in Appendix M. 
Another measure of task interdependence was used that utilized a multi-item scale. 
This allowed for a calculation of the internal consistency of the ratings, and provided an 
alternative method of assuring that the task was perceived as requiring interdependence. This 
five-item scale was designed by Kiggunda (1983), and includes items such as “I depend on 
my teammates’ work for information I need to do this task.” The internal consistency of the 
scores obtained for this scale was .70 at Time 1 and .81 at Time 2. This scale is shown in 
Appendix N.  
Deindividuation  
Bipolar adjectives were used to measure deindividuation. Taken from Jorgenson 
(1976), participants rated which of two bipolar adjectives best described their state. Example 
items were “carefree” versus “concerned”, another pair was “anonymous” versus 
“conspicuous”. For this 4-item scale, internal consistency of the scores was .49 at Time 1 and 
.60 at Time 2. This scale is shown in Appendix O. 
Team Performance 
Performance was measured by examining profit on the experimental team task. Profit 
at Time 1 served as a baseline performance measure and a control variable when examining 
profit at Time 2. The correlation between profit at Time 1 and Time 2 was .33. 
Manipulation Check 
Three questions in questionnaire given after Time 2 assessed the effectiveness of the 
manipulation. The questions, which were developed for the present study, were rated on a 
five-point Likert type scale. The question specifically designed for the external blaming 
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condition was “I feel that our team spent a lot of time making excuses for poor performance.” 
The question specifically designed for the internal blaming condition was “I feel that our 
team spent a lot of time blaming each other.” The question specifically designed for the 
strategizing condition was “I felt that our team spent a lot of time coming up with better ways 
of doing this task.” The extent to which the team members agree with the statement 
appropriate to their condition is a measure of the successfulness of the manipulation. This 
scale is shown in Appendix P. 
Results 
The task interdependence measures were first analyzed to ensure that the task was 
viewed as interdependent, a necessary prerequisite for this study. The two measures of 
interdependence, the Arthur et al. (in press) scale and the Kiggunda (1983) scale were found 
to have a near zero relationship. This prompted an examination of the construct validity of 
the two measures. Consideration of the premise of this study yields several expectations 
regarding the interdependence measure. A measure of interdependence should show high 
interdependence, as the task was designed to be interdependent. Interdependence might also 
be perceived as lower for the blaming condition at Time 2 than for the strategizing condition 
at Time 2, as this study posits that blaming should interfere with team functioning on a task, 
which might lead team members to attempt the task in a more individualistic manner. 
Similarly, cohesion, deindividuation and viability perceptions should be somewhat positively 
related to perceptions of interdependence. Table 4 shows the means on the two 
interdependence measures at Time 1 and Time 2 for each condition and overall. Table 5 
shows the correlations among the interdependence measures, the cohesion scale, the viability 
scale and the deindividuation scale. 
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These analyses suggest that the Kiggunda scale may be more accurately capturing 
perceptions of interdependence. Several pieces of evidence lead to this conclusion. The 
Kiggunda scale showed greater interdependence in the strategizing group at Time 2 than in 
the blaming group. The opposite was true for the Arthur scale. Also, the Kiggunda scale 
showed significant positive correlations with cohesion and viability, whereas the Arthur scale 
showed correlations near zero with both of these constructs. Additionally, further 
consideration of the Arthur scale suggests that it may not be an ordinal scale operating in a 
linear fashion. To the extent that it’s a categorical scale, it cannot be examined in the same 
manner as the Kiggunda scale. The Kiggunda scale had a high mean across conditions and 
the Arthur scale’s most frequently endorsed category was an interdependent category, 
suggesting that the task was an interdependent task, a necessary precondition for these 
analyses. 
Deindividuation did not relate to either the Kiggunda or the Arthur scale. Nor did it 
relate consistently with the viability and cohesion scales. The confusing pattern of 
relationships with the deindividuation scale at both Time 1 and Time 2 suggests that this 
scale may not be performing as expected. It is not clear that deindividuation is the construct 
being tapped with this scale and therefore it should be interpreted with caution in future 
analyses. 
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Table 4 
Descriptives on Interdependence Across Conditions 
 
  Arthur Scale d Kiggunda Scale d 
  Time 1 Time 2  Time 1 Time 2  
Strategizing M 3.21 3.07 -.21 4.11 4.51 .79 
 n 148 150  149 149  
 SD 0.66 0.65  0.53 0.48  
Excuse making M 3.25 3.04 -.33 4.07 4.45 .80 
 n 135 135  134 133  
 SD 0.65 0.64  0.50 0.45  
Blaming M 3.21 3.15 -.09 4.02 4.38 .65 
 n 164 162  165 165  
 SD 0.73 0.68  0.60 0.51  
Total M 3.22 3.09 -.19 4.07 4.44 .72 
 n 447 447  448 447  
 SD 0.68 0.66  0.55 0.48  
 
Table 5 
Correlations Among the Interdependence Scales, Deindividuation, Cohesion and Viability at 
Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 Arth T2 Kig T1 Kig T2 deind T1 
deind 
T2 coh T1 coh T2 viab T1 viab T2
Arth T1 .45** .06 .01 .01 -.06 .06 .08 .01 .00 
Arth T2  .04 -.07 .02 -.04 .07 .08 .01 .03 
Kig T1   .49** .03 -.01 .20** .10* .28** .21** 
Kig T2    .08 .04 .10* .16** .22** .33** 
deind T1     .62** .05 .15** -.03 .11* 
deind T2      -.07 -.05 -.10* -.10* 
coh T1       .48** .42** .28** 
coh T2        .20** .50** 
viab T1         .46** 
Note. Arth T1 and T2 is the Arthur et al. (in press) scale at Time 1 and 2, Kig T1 and T2 is 
the Kiggunda (1983) scale at Time 1 and 2, deind T1 and T2 is the deindividuation scale at 
Time 1 and 2, coh T1 and T2 is the cohesion scale at Time 1 and Time 2, and viab T1 and T2 
is the viability scale at Time 1 and Time 2. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
The first step in the examination of the research questions is to determine whether the 
manipulation succeeded. To this end a MANOVA was conducted across conditions for each 
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of the three manipulation check items. There was no overall significant difference in 
responses to the three manipulation check questions across conditions, F (2, 445) = 1.01, p = 
.42. The descriptives for the manipulation check items across conditions are shown in Table 
6. The correlations among the manipulation check items are shown in Table 7. Variation in 
the sample size for these and all subsequent analyses is due to the pairwise deletion done to 
preserve sample size despite some missing data. 
 
Table 6 
Descriptives on Manipulation Check Items Across Conditions 
  Manipulation Check Items 
Condition  Strategizing Excuse making Blaming 
Strategizing M 4.00 1.25 1.15 
 SD 1.00 0.62 0.41 
 n 149 150 149 
Excuse making M 3.86 1.36 1.26 
 SD 1.11 0.67 0.68 
 n 135 135 134 
Blaming M 3.89 1.41 1.29 
 SD 0.98 0.87 0.77 
 n 165 164 164 
 
 
Table 7 
Correlation of Manipulation Check Items  
 Made Excuses Blamed 
Strategized -.16*** -.11* 
Made Excuses  .49*** 
Blamed   
Note. *=p<.05, ***=p<.001 
 
The failure to find significant differences in the manipulation check items across 
conditions suggests that analyzing the hypotheses in Study 2 as presented will be difficult. 
For the sake of completeness, analyses of the hypotheses were conducted as originally 
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posited, although clear interpretation is hampered by the failure to find significant differences 
in the manipulation check items. 
Each of the variables of interest in this study was examined through an analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for the Time 1 version of the variable to see if there were 
differences across conditions.  
Using an ANCOVA, final profit at Time 2 was examined across the 3 conditions to 
determine the extent to which the manipulations affected the team productivity portion of 
team effectiveness. At Time 2 final profit was highest for the blaming condition (M = 59,153, 
SD = 27,812, n = 55), second highest for the strategizing condition (M = 56,441, SD = 
25,915, n = 50) and lowest for the excuse making condition (M = 49,722, SD = 21,466, n = 
45). These descriptives are summarized in Table 8, and the effect sizes within and across 
conditions are shown in Table 9. Despite the mean differences, the ANCOVA on Time 2 
profit with Time 1 profit as a covariate was not statistically significant across these three 
groups, F (2, 150) = 2.50, p = .09.  
 
Table 8 
Descriptives on Profit Across Conditions 
 
  Profit (in dollars) 
  Time 1 Time 2 
Strategizing M 21,345 56,441 
 SD 20,883 25,915 
 n 50 50 
Excuse making M 24,996 49,722 
 SD 13,825 21,466 
 N 45 45 
Blaming M 23,108 59,153 
 SD 18,668 27,812 
 N 55 55 
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Table 9 
Effect Sizes for Profit Between and Within Conditions 
 
 Strat T1 Strat T2 Excuse T1 Excuse T2 Blame T1 Blame T2 
Strat T1 - 1.49 .20 - .09 - 
Strat T2  - - -.28 - .10 
Excuse T1   - 1.37 -.11 - 
Excuse T2    - - .37 
Blame T1     - 1.52 
Blame T2      - 
Note: Effect sizes are Cohen’s ds; dashes represent conditions where effect sizes could not 
logically be computed. 
 
 
Viability was also compared across the three conditions. Viability at the group level 
was calculated as the average of the viability scale scores at the individual level. Time 1 and 
2 viability scores across conditions are shown in Table 10 with the effect sizes in Table 11. 
The ANCOVA on Time 2 viability with Time 1 viability as a covariate was also not 
statistically significant across the groups, F (2, 150) = .27, p = .76. 
 
Table 10 
Descriptives on Viability Across Conditions 
 
  Viability 
  Time 1 Time 2 
Strategizing M 4.20 4.32 
 SD 0.64 0.53 
 n 150 150 
Excuse making M 4.24 4.34 
 SD 0.53 0.53 
 n 135 135 
Blaming M 4.07 4.21 
 SD 0.54 0.67 
 n 165 164 
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Table 11 
Effect Sizes for Viability Between and Within Conditions 
 
 Strat T1 Strat T2 Excuse T1 Excuse T2 Blame T1 Blame T2 
Strat T1 - .20 .07 - -.22 - 
Strat T2  - - .04 - -.18 
Excuse T1   - .19 -.32 - 
Excuse T2    - - -.21 
Blame T1     - .23 
Blame T2      - 
Note: Effect sizes are Cohen’s ds; dashes represent conditions where effect sizes could not 
logically be computed. 
 
 
Table 12 presents the descriptives for cohesion at Time 1 and Time 2, with the effect 
size shown in Table 13. Cohesion at the group level was also calculated as the average of the 
cohesion scale scores at the individual level. The ANCOVA for Time 2 cohesion with Time 
1 cohesion as a covariate also was not statistically significant across experimental conditions, 
F (2, 150) = .00, p = .99. 
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Table 12 
Descriptives on Cohesion Across Conditions 
 
  Cohesion 
  Time 1 Time 2 
Strategizing M 4.11 4.26 
 SD 0.49 0.49 
 n 149 149 
Excuse making M 4.08 4.19 
 SD 0.474 0.50 
 n 132 130 
Blaming M 4.07 4.22 
 SD 0.51 0.52 
 n 161 162 
 
Table 13 
Effect Sizes for Cohesion Between and Within Conditions 
 
 Strat T1 Strat T2 Excuse T1 Excuse T2 Blame T1 Blame T2 
Strat T1 - .31 -.06 - -.08 - 
Strat T2  - - -.14 - -.08 
Excuse T1   - .23 -.02 - 
Excuse T2    - - .06 
Blame T1     - .29 
Blame T2      - 
Note: Effect sizes are Cohen’s ds; dashes represent conditions where effect sizes could not 
logically be computed. 
 
 
Table 4 showed the descriptives for the Kiggunda interdependence scale at Time 1 
and Time 2, with the effect sizes shown in Table 14. Interdependence at the group level was 
calculated as the average of the interdependence scale scores at the individual level. The 
ANCOVA for Time 2 interdependence with Time 1 interdependence as a covariate was not 
significant across experimental conditions, F (2, 150) = 1.04, p = .36. 
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Table 14 
Effect Sizes for Kiggunda Interdependence Scale Between and Within Conditions 
 
 Strat T1 Strat T2 Excuse T1 Excuse T2 Blame T1 Blame T2 
Strat T1 - .79 -.08 - -.16 - 
Strat T2  - - -.13 - -.26 
Excuse T1   - .79 -.08 - 
Excuse T2    - - -.13 
Blame T1     - .64 
Blame T2      - 
Note: Effect sizes are Cohen’s ds; dashes represent conditions where effect sizes could not 
logically be computed. 
 
 
Table 4 contained the descriptives statistics for the Arthur et al. interdependence scale 
at Time 1 and Time 2, with the effect size shown in Table 15. Interdependence for this scale 
at the group level was the average of the interdependence scale scores at the individual level. 
The ANCOVA for Time 2 interdependence with Time 1 interdependence as a covariate was 
not significant across experimental conditions, F (2, 150) = 1.07, p = .35. 
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Table 15 
Effect Sizes for Arthur et al. Interdependence Scale Between and Within Conditions 
 
 Strat T1 Strat T2 Excuse T1 Excuse T2 Blame T1 Blame T2 
Strat T1 - -.21 .06 - .00 - 
Strat T2  - - -.04 - .11 
Excuse T1   - -.32 -.06 - 
Excuse T2    - - .16 
Blame T1     - -.08 
Blame T2      - 
Note: Effect sizes are Cohen’s ds; dashes represent conditions where effect sizes could not 
logically be computed. 
 
 
Table 16 presents the descriptives for the deindividuation scale at Time 1 and Time 2, 
with the effect size shown in Table 17. Deindividuation was also aggregated at the group 
level by taking the mean within teams. The ANCOVA for Time 2 deindividuation with Time 
1 deindividuation as a covariate was not significant across experimental conditions, F (2, 
150) = 0.55, p = .58. 
 
 49
Table 16 
Descriptives on Deindividuation Across Conditions 
 
  Deindividuation 
  Time 1 Time 2 
Strategizing M 3.51 3.16 
 SD 0.34 0.28 
 n 50 50 
Excuse making M 3.49 3.11 
 SD 0.43 0.28 
 n 45 45 
Blaming M 3.45 3.13 
 SD 0.40 0.25 
 n 55 55 
 
Table 17 
Effect Sizes for Deindividuation Between and Within Conditions 
 
 Strat T1 Strat T2 Excuse T1 Excuse T2 Blame T1 Blame T2 
Strat T1 - -1.14 -.05 - -.16 - 
Strat T2  - - -.16 - -.09 
Excuse T1   - -1.05 -.09 - 
Excuse T2    - - .08 
Blame T1     - -.97 
Blame T2      - 
Note: Effect sizes are Cohen’s ds; dashes represent conditions where effect sizes could not 
logically be computed. 
 
 
The fact that none of these ANCOVAs produced significant differences is not 
surprising considering the failure of the manipulation to create meaningful group differences. 
However, in the interest of examining the research questions in greater detail despite the 
failure of the manipulation, supplementary analyses were run using the manipulation check 
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items as the independent variables. Four separate regressions were run predicting the key 
dependent variables of interest, profit at Time 2, viability at Time 2, deindividuation at Time 
2 and cohesion at Time 2. Each of these regressions controlled for the corresponding time 1 
variable (i.e., profit at Time 2 controlled for profit at Time 1). The regression for profit was 
run at the team level of analysis using the average team response to the three manipulation 
check items, due to the fact that the dependent variable, profit, was a team-level variable. The 
other three variables were collected at the individual level, therefore these regressions were 
conducted at the individual level of analysis. These analyses are shown in Tables 18 to 21.  
 
Table 18 
Team-level Regression Predicting Profit at Time 2 
Step β R2 ∆ R2 
1. Profit Time 1 .33*** .11***  
2. Profit Time 1 .32***   
    Strategizing .13 .14*** .03 
    Excuse making -.04   
    Blaming .15   
Note. ***p<.001 
 
Table 19 
Regression Predicting Viability at Time 2 
Step β2 R2 ∆ R2 
1. Viability Time 1 .47*** .22***  
2. Viability Time 1 .41***   
    Strategizing .21*** .32*** .11*** 
    Excuse making -.19***   
    Blaming -.06   
Note. ***p<.001 
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Table 20 
Regression Predicting Deindividuation at Time 2 
Step β2 R2 ∆ R2 
1. Deind Time 1 .62*** .38***  
2. Deind Time 1 .63***   
    Strategizing -.04 .39*** .01 
    Excuse making .08   
    Blaming .02   
Note. ***p<.001 
 
Table 21 
Regression Predicting Cohesion at Time 2 
Step β2 R2 ∆ R2 
1. Cohesion Time 1 .48*** .24***  
2. Cohesion Time 1 .37***   
    Strategizing .08 .34*** .11*** 
    Excuse making -.27***   
    Blaming -.09*   
Note. *p<.05, ***p<.001 
 
 
The manipulation check variables (the amount of blaming, excuse making, and 
strategizing) did not significantly increase the prediction of profit or deindividuation at Time 
2 when controlling for the corresponding Time 1 variable. However, the manipulation check 
variables did significantly increase the prediction of cohesion and viability at Time 2 when 
controlling for the corresponding Time 1 variable. Strategizing positively and significantly 
predicted viability at Time 2 when controlling for viability at Time 1. Excuse making 
negatively and significantly predicted viability at Time 2 when controlling for viability at 
Time 1. Blaming did not significantly predict viability at Time 2. In contrast, for cohesion, 
blaming significantly negatively predicted cohesion at Time 2 when controlling for cohesion 
at Time 1. Strategizing did not reach statistical significance in predicting cohesion at Time 2 
(p = .06). Excuse making negatively and significantly predicted cohesion at Time 2, and its 
beta weight was several times larger than that for blaming or excuse making.  
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A final consideration was the amount of time spent discussing strategies, blaming or 
making excuses. Although the number of minutes spent on discussion varied across 
conditions, controlling for this variable did not change any of the findings from the 
regressions previously reported. Overall, the amount of discussion time was within a very 
narrow range, by design. The maximum amount of discussion time was 10 minutes. Table 22 
shows how the discussion time variable varied across conditions. 
 
Table 22 
Descriptives on Discussion Time in Minutes Across Conditions 
 
  Discussion Minutes 
   
Strategizing M 7.10 
 n 150 
 SD 3.05 
Excuse making M 3.41 
 n 135 
 SD 2.10 
Blaming M 4.29 
 n 165 
 SD 2.61 
Total M 4.96 
 n 450 
 SD 3.05 
 
Study 2 Discussion 
 Support was not found for Hypotheses 3 and 4, and the results for Hypothesis 5 were 
mixed. Although Hypothesis 5 was not supported exactly as predicted, possibly due to the 
failure of the manipulation, there was mixed support for this hypothesis when examined in a 
post-hoc correlational manner. However, such a correlational analysis was not the goal of 
this study, as it limits the ability to examine causality. Although the teams appeared to be 
 53
reacting appropriately to the manipulation instructions during the pilot session for each 
condition, more thorough pilot testing and analyses would have been wise, as the failure of 
the manipulation could have been discovered and remedied.   
Although it is not entirely clear why there were no strong differences in the amount of 
blaming, strategizing, or excuse making between conditions, several possibilities exist: the 
instructions were not strongly worded enough, the situation was not sufficiently strong 
enough to create potentially socially uncomfortable interactions (i.e., blaming), or the 
timeframe was too short. On a 1 to 5 scale of blaming, with 1 representing no blaming, teams 
averaged 1.3 in the blaming condition and 1.1 in the strategizing condition. This suggests that 
individual members of teams across conditions did not feel that they were blamed for the 
poor performance of the team regardless of the condition. In contrast, the teams in the 
strategizing condition rated their amount of strategizing at 4.0, compared to 3.9 for the 
blaming condition, indicating that strategizing occurred frequently across conditions. The 
excuse making condition was similarly undifferentiated.  
However, the fact that the amount of discussion was less in the excuse making and 
blaming conditions than in the strategizing condition suggests an alternative explanation for 
the lack of blaming and excuse making. It could be the case that the teams were reacting 
appropriately across conditions, but did not have sufficient things to blame or make excuses 
about. The discussion period for teams was ended when they were no longer discussing the 
topic for that condition. On average, teams did not use their full 10 minute discussion period, 
but this was especially true for the blaming and excuse making conditions, where they used 
less than half of their discussion period on average. The task was designed to allow for 
sufficient complexity for teams to be able to strategize, however, insufficient consideration 
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was given to designing a task that would create conditions for blaming and making excuses. 
Real world teams are likely to possess history and conditions that would allow for much 
more blaming and excuse making than occurred in this study.   
Despite the failure to create differences across the groups, some differences in 
responses to the feedback occurred naturally at the individual level. The manipulation check 
items could be used as a measure of the extent to which individuals within teams felt their 
team spent a lot of time blaming, strategizing, or making excuses. These items did not 
measure whether or not the respondent actually felt blamed or personally engaged in 
strategizing or excuse making, but rather provided the respondent an opportunity to evaluate 
how much time they felt their team spent on these activities. Because the analysis of the 
responses to the manipulation questions was purely post-hoc and not constrained by 
condition, it is not possible to confidently draw causal inferences regarding the direction of 
the relationship between these perceptions and either viability or cohesion. Nevertheless, the 
findings provide useful information for future studies and discussion.  
Perceptions of the amount of time spent making excuses were negatively associated 
with both viability and cohesion, yet perceptions of time spent blaming were only 
significantly negatively associated with cohesion, and were not as strongly related to either 
variable as excuse making. This was true despite the moderately strong relationship between 
excuse making and blaming perceptions (r = .49). This suggests that these two reactions 
although related have different relationships with a component of team effectiveness.  
Because the manipulation only measures perceptions of time spent on a reaction 
rather than the actual length of the reaction or the qualitative nature of the reaction, 
conclusions are difficult to draw. In a three-person team it is possible for there to be a great 
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amount of time spent blaming without the majority of the team actually experiencing being 
blamed. Scapegoating, for example, could result in two of the three team members actually 
bonding in their blaming of the third team member. This might help to explain the puzzling 
positive relationship between averaged team responses to blaming and team-level profit. The 
fact that blaming did not negatively predict profit suggests that perhaps blaming within a 
team does not necessarily lead to reduced productivity. It might in fact be justified and 
contribute to higher productivity despite whatever negative affectivity it promotes in specific 
individuals. In such a case, the negative affectivity of blaming theorized to contribute to 
lowered team effectiveness might be limited to the individual actually blamed.  
Excuse making, on the other hand, might be a more diffuse negative contributor or 
response to low viability. Specific affective reactions within individuals were not expected 
from generalized excuse making. Rather, excuse making was postulated to represent a 
tendency to reject feedback and disengage from the task. Disengagement could be related to 
lowered perceptions of viability and cohesion. 
Strategizing was positively related to both viability and cohesion. It occurred to a 
relatively high degree across conditions and was negatively related to both blaming and 
excuse making (with a stronger negative relationship to excuse making then blaming). 
Although it did not predict productivity as it did in Study 1, strategizing did positively relate 
to viability and cohesiveness. These findings suggest that it is useful for teams to spend time 
developing strategies in order to increase team effectiveness, especially the viability 
component of effectiveness. 
Although some results were found, the boundary conditions of Study 2 limited the 
extent to which the questions could be studied. Boundary conditions in Study 2 include the 
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restriction on team size, the nature of the task, and the nature of the team. It is possible to 
conduct a “thought experiment” and imagine how results may have differed if these 
boundary conditions had been different.   
Allowing for variability in team size would have allowed for an examination of this 
variable as a moderator in a controlled environment. A team size of three, although sufficient 
to reach the threshold of what could be considered a team, is nevertheless an arbitrary figure 
that may not reflect the typical team size. Additionally there may be dynamics that occur 
within different team sizes that could be better investigated with variable team sizes. The 
formation of cliques or in-groups and out-groups, for instance, is more likely with larger 
team sizes. 
The task in Study 2 was designed to be complex enough to allow for the formation of 
strategies but easy enough to perform within minutes of being exposed to it. Although such a 
task meets the needs of a lab study, where students do not have time to learn a truly complex 
task, it limits the extent to which we can say that the task being studied is representative of 
what teams face in the field. The simplest job in the field is likely to be much more complex 
than the task performed in this study. If time permitted for teams to learn and perform a more 
representative task, the results may have been more generalizable. Allowing for variability in 
task complexity and measurement of task complexity would also have been useful in 
understanding how the interaction between team reactions and team effectiveness may be 
moderated by task complexity. 
Finally, the artificial nature of the team must be considered. If it were possible to 
create a more realistic team, there might have been more opportunity and motivation for 
blaming or excuse making. In the field, teams are often composed of individuals who are 
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reasonably familiar with each other and have complex motives regarding the task being 
performed and the people with whom the task is being performed. There could be political, 
emotional and relational considerations that could have a significant effect on both how 
teams react to feedback and how these reactions affect subsequent team effectiveness. The 
comparative social context of teams might be an important component of how different team 
reactions influence the motivation and thereby performance of the team. As Ellemers et al. 
(2004) propose “people will identify more with a particular collective (e.g., their work team) 
to the extent that it meaningfully distinguishes them from other relevant collectives (e.g., 
other teams in the organization)” (p. 463). Because the teams in Study 2 had no obvious 
comparison groups to distinguish themselves against, they may not have felt as motivated to 
identify themselves with the team. This could be an important distinction from teams in the 
field, where there are generally numerous teams within an organization that can serve to 
define each other and create a motivation based on team-level factors. Examining real world 
teams in a controlled environment may have revealed some of these dynamics and allowed 
for a better understanding of the issues. 
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OVERALL DISCUSSION 
 
The results of Study 1 show that in a diverse sample of feedback meetings blaming and 
strategizing consume about one-third of the meetings on average. Assuming the sample in 
Study 1 is relatively representative, then strategizing and blaming appear to be relatively 
common occurrences in team feedback sessions. If such reactions occur with some regularity, 
then it becomes worthwhile to examine their relationships to performance.  
From Study 1, it would appear that strategy formation following feedback is 
significantly positively related to team performance improvements while team blaming is 
negatively related to team performance improvements. The many limitations of Study 1, 
however, suggested the need for a follow-up lab study. Unfortunately, the failure of the 
manipulation in Study 2 precludes the drawing of substantive inferences from this study. The 
artificiality of the lab setting, the temporary nature of the teams, and the diluted nature of the 
manipulation may have led to homogeneity of reactions across conditions.  
Despite the failure of the controlled manipulation, some variability in the time spent on 
these three reactions of interest occurred naturally. This is consistent with the finding of 
Study 1 that teams naturally display these three reactions to some degree. Supplementary 
analyses based on these natural variations in blaming, strategizing, and excuse making 
provided interesting findings that suggest a re-evaluation of several of the hypotheses may be 
in order.  
Although blaming was predicted to be negatively related to productivity, the observed 
effect was actually in the opposite direction. The predicted effect of blaming on the viability 
component of team effectiveness was also not found. Although blaming was significantly 
negatively related to cohesion, it did not significantly predict viability. The short-term and 
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artificial nature of the three-person student teams may partially explain the conflicting 
findings with Study 1. There may also be some beneficial effects of blaming that cannot be 
understood without a more qualitative examination of blaming.  
Excuse making was not examined in Study 1, but the findings in Study 2 were 
somewhat contrary to the hypotheses. Although excuse making was proposed to be a 
relatively benign phenomenon, the correlations observed in Study 2 suggest that the 
relationship between viability and cohesion and time spent making excuses is greater and 
more negative than expected.  
As expected, strategizing was related to higher viability and cohesion in Study 2. It was 
positively related to productivity in Study 1 and was positively related to productivity in 
Study 2 (though this relationship was not significant). The relationship between spending 
time on strategizing and improving team effectiveness is theoretically and intuitively to be 
expected.  
Implications for Theory and Practice 
As discussed in the introduction, there are numerous theoretical reasons for why the 
presence of blaming or excuse making during a feedback meeting may serve as a signal that 
the feedback will not improve performance. These reasons range from a likely lack of 
feedback acceptance to a breakdown in team cooperation. The picture may be complicated 
however by the existence of instances where blaming may actually be necessary and 
important. Although this study suggests that such blaming may somewhat impair viability or 
at least fail to improve it, the productivity component of team effectiveness may be improved 
in isolated instances. Study 2 can be interpreted as an example of how team effectiveness can 
be unaffected by the presence of internal blaming. Study 1, however, would suggest that in 
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the long term, time spent blaming is negatively related to subsequent productivity 
improvement. Excuse making, however, was negatively related to team effectiveness in both 
studies. These findings suggest that excuse making may be more of an issue to managers 
wishing to encourage team effectiveness, than internal blaming. Neither reaction, however, 
was found to positively contribute to team effectiveness. Conversely, strategizing appears to 
have a positive effect on team effectiveness across studies. Teams that engage in strategizing 
for improvement during a feedback meeting may be signaling some degree of feedback 
acceptance and are also likely engaging in active cooperation and building a shared mental 
model.  
The results of this paper suggest that managers should pay attention to how teams 
respond to feedback. If blaming starts to occur, either internal to the team or external as a 
form of excuse making, it may require an evaluation of whether such blaming is useful and to 
what extent it should be allowed. Strategizing appears to have a generally positive effect on 
all components of team effectiveness, therefore, managers may wish to focus the team’s 
attention on how to make improvements rather than blaming. Such a focus shift could lead to 
better team strategies on work tasks. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Although it is tempting to make causal statements about the effects of blaming and 
strategizing on performance, the correlational nature of Study 1 and of the supplementary 
analyses in Study 2 limit this. It is possible that feedback indicating performance is high 
produces more strategizing and feedback that performance is low produces blaming. One 
approach to the causality issue would be to measure the level of strategizing, excuse making, 
and blaming during each feedback meeting. Although still not a perfect experimental design, 
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looking at lagged relationships between performance and the three feedback reactions would 
allow us to better deal with the causality question.  
Another limitation is that Study 1 used only one feedback system, ProMES. Although 
Study 2 provided an analysis of a different feedback system, the failure of the scripted 
feedback to create changes in reactions suggests that the feedback in Study 2 may not have 
been representative of real world feedback. The reactions that actually were observed in 
Study 2 were likely created within the team as a result of the idiosyncrasies in team 
composition and performance, rather than as a result of the script read by the experimenter. 
Field studies utilizing a variety of feedback methods may be best suited to examining the 
phenomenon of how teams respond to feedback and how this relates to subsequent team 
effectiveness. 
A third limitation concerns the measurement of blaming, strategizing and excuse 
making. These reactions were measured in both studies through estimates of the amount of 
time spent on these activities. This creates an implicit assumption that subjective reports of 
the amount of time spent blaming, strategizing, or excuse making are the same as the actual 
amount of blaming, strategizing, or excuse making. Also, these reactions were not 
qualitatively defined, which prevents an examination of how different types of blaming or 
strategizing might relate to team effectiveness. Finally, the reliability of the scores for some 
of the constructs measured, such as deindividuation was quite low, making it more difficult 
to examine the research questions. Future research might investigate the relationship between 
self-reports of the amount of time spent on these activities and a more direct measure of the 
actual amount of strategizing, blaming or excuse making that occurs. Future research might 
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also qualitatively examine these reactions and utilize measures whose scores are more 
reliable. 
Another limitation concerns the potential overlaps between blaming and strategizing. In 
some cases, blaming could be a form of strategizing, in that the discussion of blame can 
highlight methods of improvement. To the extent that this “strategic blaming” occurs, 
separating the effects of blaming and strategizing would be difficult. Because no qualitative 
differences in excuse making, strategizing, or blaming were investigated, it is not possible to 
determine how often strategic blaming occurred. Future research should examine qualitative 
differences in excuse making, blaming and strategizing and how these qualitative differences 
relate to team effectiveness. 
Finally, it is important to note that no measures were taken of the actual affective 
reactions of team members, which were posited to play a role in predicting team 
effectiveness. Future research might examine how the affective reactions of team members 
moderate the relationship between strategizing, blaming, and excuse making and team 
effectiveness.  
Conclusion 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) noted that feedback is not always beneficial and that we need 
to know more about the process of how feedback leads to performance. These studies 
focused on three such process variables: blaming, excuse making, and strategizing. The 
results of the studies showed that these process variables do occur in real-world teams and 
that there are relationships between these variables and team effectiveness measures. The 
present study was unable to determine the causal path between these variables and team 
effectiveness because of the failure of the manipulation in the controlled lab study. Creating a 
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condition of blaming may be especially problematic in a controlled lab environment where 
real world social dynamics can be difficult to recreate. Overall, the fidelity of an experiment 
involving short-term teams of college students may be too low to effectively investigate these 
potential phenomena. Nevertheless, the results of Study 1 and the post-hoc analyses in Study 
2 suggest that excuse making, blaming, and strategizing may be important process variables, 
and research on their effects may well help us understand the feedback/performance 
relationship at a conceptual level and enable us to better understand how to provide feedback 
in work settings.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
REACTIONS DURING FEEDBACK MEETINGS SCALE 
 
Question taken from ProMES meta-analysis questionnaire located online at 
http://www.tamu.edu/promes/meta-gp2.htm. 
 
During initial feedback meetings what percent of the meeting time was characterized by the 
following behaviors. (These should sum to equal 100%): 
_____ Constructive feedback about performance. 
_____ Constructive attempts to identify problem causes. 
_____ Constructive attempts to develop improvement strategies. 
_____ Constructive discussions about future goals. 
_____ Irrelevant discussion. 
_____ Blaming and searching for excuses. 
_____ Other positive discussion. 
Explain:___________________________________________ 
_____ Other negative discussion. 
Explain:___________________________________________ 
 
What was the average length of feedback meetings?__________ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SAMPLE PROMES FEEDBACK REPORT WITH PRODUCTIVITY/EFFECTIVENESS 
SCORES 
 
 
 
PRODUCTIVITY REPORT FOR: SAMPLE department 
Basic Effectiveness Data For: may02 
 
================================================================= 
 
 
                                         Indicator  Effectiveness 
Products and Indicators                        Data          Score 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Process payroll timely/accurately 
% bills over 2 days w/ action             100.00  100 
# months Due To complete by 20th   6.00   85 
%pay vouchers cleared on Due To     100.00             25 
% pay approval forms signed            75.00       80 
% rejects posted w/in 60 days    52.17   7 
$amt rejects not posted for 60 days   16000.00         90 
 
    Process payroll timely/accurately,   Total                387 
 
Excellent & courteous customer svc 
   # complaints                                 1.00   49 
   % closeout processed in 3 days       99.27  30 
 
    Excellent & courteous customer svc,  Total                 79 
 
 
 
OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS SCORE:       466 
 
PERCENTAGE OF MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE:  84% 
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APPENDIX C 
MARKET PRICES FOR THE MANUFACTURING TASK 
 
Manufacturing Task:  Market Information  #1 
 
First 5 minutes (0:00 - 5:00) 
 
 Component Costs 
 
  Component    Cost   
 
  2  x  4      80    
 
  2  x  2      60    
 
  1  x  2      40 
 
  1  x  1      20 
  
  Wheels    200 
 
 
 Selling Prices 
 
  Product    Market Price 
 
   Jeep     3000 
 
   Boat     2300 
 
   Robot     2000 
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Manufacturing Task:  Market Information   #2 
 
Second 5 minutes (5:00 - 10:00) 
 
 Component Costs 
 
 Component     Cost   
 
 2  x  4      100    
 
 2  x  2      75    
 
 1  x  2      10 
 
 1  x  1      20 
 
 Wheels     200 
 
 
 Selling Prices 
 
 Product     Market Price 
 
 Jeep      2000 
 
 Boat      4000 
 
 Robot      2500 
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Manufacturing Task:  Market Information  #3 
 
Third 5 minutes (10:00 - 15:00) 
 
 Component Costs 
 
 Component     Cost   
 
 2  x  4      100    
 
 2  x  2      50    
  
 1  x  2      100 
 
 1  x  1      50 
 
 Wheels     500 
 
 
 Selling Prices 
 
 Product     Market Price 
 
 Jeep      5000 
 
 Boat      2000 
 
 Robot      1000 
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Manufacturing Task:  Market Information  #4 
 
Fourth 5 minutes (15:00 - 20:00) 
 
 Component Costs 
 
 Component     Cost   
 
 2  x  4      50    
 
 2  x  2      50    
 
 1  x  2      100 
  
 1  x  1      200 
 
 Wheels     400 
 
 
 Selling Prices 
 
 Product     Market Price 
 
 Jeep      3000 
 
 Boat      1000 
 
 Robot      3500 
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APPENDIX D 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MANUFACTURING TASK. 
 You are a business organization that manufactures the products displayed on the 
buyer’s table: jeeps, robots, and boats. In this exercise, you will purchase Lego© materials 
from the supplier, assemble products, and sell finished products back for profit. Your goal is to 
make as much profit as you can in this task. The teams that make the most profit will receive 
$20 per team member. 
 You have been given the following materials to assist you in production: 
  1) A model, diagram and configuration of each product 
  2) “Market information” that lists your supply costs and selling prices 
  3) An Order Request Form to submit to the supplier when ordering material 
 You are given $10,000 dollars for start-up costs at the beginning of the performance 
session. You cannot “borrow” more money. So, for example, your first order cannot exceed 
$10,000. If you over-spend at any point, you will be penalized 15% of your profits at the end of 
the task. It is your responsibility to keep track of the money you spend and the money you 
receive from selling the products. You can use the money that you earn (revenue) to buy more 
raw materials. Therefore, you are not limited to spending the initial $10,000.  
 You will have a few minutes to read these instructions and organize your materials. The 
supplier will inform you when the task is to begin. At that time you can take your first order to 
the supplier. You are allowed only one order at a time, however you may make as many orders 
as you want. Write all of your orders on your Order Request Form.  
 You have 20 minutes to perform this task. At any time during the task, you may ask the 
supplier how much time is remaining. You are responsible for tracking time. To sell your 
products you must indicate you are selling to the supplier. The supplier will not assume that 
you want to sell a particular product. If the products do not match your models, then they will 
be returned to you for repair (colors do not have to match). The revenues that you gain from 
sales can be used to buy more materials and assemble additional products. All transactions 
must be completed during the allotted 20 minutes. You may not sell products after performance 
time expires, and the supplier will not purchase unfinished products or excess materials. 
 In order to better represent the limitations of a business environment, each of you will 
have a role that limits what you can do. The person assigned to role X will be unable to touch 
the 2x4 Legos. The person assigned to role Y will be unable to touch the 2x2 Legos. The 
person assigned to role Z will be unable to buy or sell Legos. You must decide as a team who 
will be Person X, Person Y and Person Z. Tell the administrator who is in each role before the 
experiment begins.  
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APPENDIX E 
MANUFACTURING TASK ORDERING FORM 
Quantity 
  
  Order      #1    #2    #3     #4    #5    #6 
 
 2 X 4 
  
 2 X 2 
 
 1 X 2 
 
 1 X 1 
 
 
 Wheels         
 
 
Quantity 
  
  Order      #7    #8    #9     #10   #11   #12 
 
 2 X 4 
  
 2 X 2 
 
 1 X 2 
 
 1 X 1 
 
 
 Wheels         
 
 
 
 81
APPENDIX F 
 
LEGO© CONFIGURATION FOR EACH MODEL 
 
Lego Components 
 
 
 
     Jeep  Boat  Robot 
 
2 x 4    13  12  10 
 
 
2 x 2     2  12  11 
 
 
1 x 2     4   
 
 
1 x 1     4 
 
 
Wheels     2 
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APPENDIX G 
 
MANUFACTURING DIAGRAM 
Two 2 x 2s wide 
2 x 4
Four 1 x 1s wide
Two 2 X 4s wide
Two 1 x 2s wide
Robot 
Jeep 
Boat 
2 x 4s
2 x 2s
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APPENDIX H 
MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS CONDITION A 
 
 
Calculate the team’s profit. Provide the team with the following feedback: 
“Your profit on this task was <total the profit from the transaction log(s)>. According to the 
norms for this task <pretend to read the Norms Sheet>, your team is in the 35th percentile of 
all students who have done this task. Shortly, you will be given the chance to engage in this 
task a second time. Your profit on this second task will be used to determine whether or not 
your team qualifies for the cash prize. Before you begin the second round spend some time 
discussing and listing all the ways that your team could improve on this task. This is your 
opportunity to develop better strategies for performance. Please designate one person as the 
note taker and list all strategies and methods for increasing your profit on this task. You will 
have up to 10 minutes to discuss how to improve your performance strategies. You may 
begin.” 
  
84
 
APPENDIX I 
MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS CONDITION B 
 
 
Calculate the team’s profit. Provide the team with the following feedback: 
“Your profit on this task was <total the profit from the transaction log(s)>. According to the 
norms for this task <pretend to read the Norms Sheet>, your team is in the 35th percentile of 
all students who have done this task. Shortly, you will be given the chance to engage in this 
task a second time. Your profit on this second task will be used to determine whether or not 
your team qualifies for the cash prize. Before you begin the second round spend some time 
discussing and listing all of the reasons this task was difficult to perform. Please designate 
one person as the note taker and list all the things that were outside of your team’s control 
that contributed to your team doing poorly on the task. You will have up to 10 minutes to 
discuss and list reasons outside of your control for why your team did not perform as well as 
it could have on this task. Such reasons include: the experimenter being slow or making 
mistakes, the instructions being unclear, or the Legos not fitting together properly. You may 
begin.” 
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APPENDIX J 
MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS CONDITION C 
 
 
Calculate the team’s profit. Provide the team with the following feedback: 
“Your profit on this task was <total the profit from the transaction log(s)>. According to the 
norms for this task <pretend to read the Norms Sheet>, your team is in the 35th percentile of 
all students who have done this task. Shortly, you will be given the chance to engage in this 
task a second time. Your profit on this second task will be used to determine whether or not 
your team qualifies for the cash prize. Before you begin the second round spend some time 
discussing and listing all of the reasons within your team’s control that prevented your team 
from doing well on this task. Please designate one person as the note taker and list all of the 
things within the control of one or more of the team members that contributed to your poor 
performance on the task. You will have up to 10 minutes to discuss and list reasons within 
each person’s control for why your team did not perform as well as it could have on this task. 
Such reasons include lack of effort by specific team members, certain team members not 
understanding the task, poor cooperation, or making poor decisions about which team 
members should do what. You may begin.” 
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APPENDIX K 
 
TEAM VIABILITY SCALE 
 
These questions are from Sinclair (2003).  
 
On your scantron, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
The answer key is as follows: 
A. Strongly Agree B. Agree C. Neither Agree nor Disagree D. Disagree E. Strongly Disagree 
 
1. I would be willing to participate in another study with this same 
group of individuals 
A B C D E
2. I feel that this group of individuals would work well together on 
another task. 
A B C D E
3. I would enjoy working with this same group of individuals on 
another task. 
A B C D E
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APPENDIX L 
 
TEAM COHESION SCALE 
 
These questions came from Widmeyer et al. (1985) and include the attraction and cohesion 
parts of the task and integration subscales, but exclude the social subscale 
 
On your scantron, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
The answer key is as follows: 
A. Strongly Agree B. Agree C. Neither Agree nor Disagree D. Disagree E. Strongly Disagree 
 
1. I am not happy with the amount of time I get to interact with my 
team members. (R) 
A B C D E
2. I am unhappy with my team’s level of desire to perform well. (R) A B C D E
3. This team does not give me enough opportunities to improve my 
personal performance on this task. (R) 
A B C D E
4. I do not like the style of interaction on this team. (R) A B C D E
5. Our team is united in trying to reach its goals for performance. A B C D E
6. We all take responsibility for any poor performance by our team. A B C D E
7. Our team members have conflicting goals for the team’s 
performance. (R) 
A B C D E
8. If members of our team have problems, everyone wants to help 
them so we can get back on track. 
A B C D E
9. Our team members do not communicate freely about each team 
member’s responsibilities during our interactions. (R) 
A B C D E
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APPENDIX M 
 
ARTHUR  MEASURE OF TASK INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
This item came from Arthur et al. (in press). 
 
Below are several descriptions and illustrations of how work could be done in a team. Read 
each description and look at its accompanying illustration and mark on your scantron which 
description best describes how work was performed in your team on this task. 
 
 
Description 
 
Illustration 
 
RESPONSE 
Work and activities are performed 
separately by all team members 
and work does not flow between 
members of the team. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
? 
Work and activities flow from one 
member to another in the team, but 
mostly in one direction. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
? 
Work and activities flow between 
team members in a back–and–forth 
manner over a period of time. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
? 
Work and activities come into the 
team and members must diagnose, 
problem solve, and/or collaborate 
as a team in order to accomplish 
the team’s task. 
Work Enters Team
Work Leaves Team  
? 
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APPENDIX N 
 
TASK INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
These questions came from Kiggunda (1983).  
 
On your scantron, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
The answer key is as follows: 
A. Strongly Agree B. Agree C. Neither Agree nor Disagree D. Disagree E. Strongly Disagree 
 
1. Our task cannot be done unless my teammates do their work. A B C D E
2. I depend on my teammates for information I need to do this task. A B C D E
3. I depend on my teammates for materials, tools, or supplies that I 
need to do this task. 
A B C D E
4. This task depends on the work of my teammates for its completion. A B C D E
5. Most of my task activities are affected by the task activities of my 
teammates. 
A B C D E
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APPENDIX O 
 
DEINDIVIDUATION SCALE 
 
These questions came from Jorgenson (1976).  
 
Below are several pairs of opposite adjectives. On your scantron, fill in the letter closest to 
the adjective describing how you feel at the moment. If you are undecided, fill in “c”. For 
example, if you feel somewhat Carefree, you would fill in the letter “d”. 
 
1. Concerned (a)—(b)—(c)—(d)—(e) Carefree 
2. Conspicuous (a)—(b)—(c)—(d)—(e) Anonymous 
3. Free (a)—(b)—(c)—(d)—(e) Restrained 
4. Inhibited (a)—(b)—(c)—(d)—(e) Uninhibited 
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APPENDIX P 
 
MANIPULATION CHECK ITEMS 
 
The researcher designed these questions. 
On your scantron, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
The answer key is as follows: 
A. Strongly Agree B. Agree C. Neither Agree nor Disagree D. Disagree E. Strongly Disagree 
 
1. I feel that our team spent a lot of time making excuses for poor 
performance. 
A B C D E
2. I feel that our team spent a lot of time coming up with better ways 
of doing this task. 
A B C D E
3. I feel that our team spent a lot of time blaming each other. A B C D E
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